Invalid Contracts for Contingent Fees by Brewster, James H.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1908
Invalid Contracts for Contingent Fees
James H. Brewster
University of Michigan Law School
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1301
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Response or Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brewster, James H. "Invalid Contracts for Contingent Fees." Mich. L. Rev. 7 (1908): 61-2.
NOTE AND COMMFBNT
INVALID CONTRACTS FOR CONTINGENT Fzs.-It is not unusual that agree-
ments between attorneys and clients providing for contingent fees contain
a stipulation to the effect that no settlement of the c6ntroversy concerning
%'hich there is a bargain foir fees shall be made by the client without the
attorney's consent.
In the recent case of Davy et at. v. Fidelity and Casualty Ins. Co., 85
N. E. 504, the Supreme Court of Ohio condemns such an agreement as
champertous and, by the citation of many Ohio decisions, "demonstrates that,
this court has always maintained a consistent and unambiguous attitude in
regard to contracts of the kind which we have in this case." The court
holds that the illegal stipulation renders the whole contract illegal and
indivisible, and that the illegal stipulation cannot be ignored and the other
provisions of the contract enforced. •
In a number of other recent decisions substantially the same doctrine has
been announced. Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 19o, 74 Am. St. Rep. 81, 45
L. R. A. 196; North Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. ioo, 49 N. E.
222, 44 L. R. A. 177; Davis v. Chase, 159 Ind. 242, 64 N. E. 88, 95 Am.
St. Rep. 294. Irt this last case the contract provided for a contingent fee of
fifty per cent of the amount recovered, and the client agreed that he would
"not enter into any compromise or accept any sum of money in settlement
of said claim unless said [attorney] is present and directs said settlement,"
and, while an attempt was made by counsel to distinguish this clause from
those that distinctly provided that the client could not settle without the
attorney's consent, the court held that the provision was invalid and was
fatal to the whole contract.
The New York Court of Appeals, in In re Snyder, i9o N. Y. 66, 82 N. E,
742, states some of the reasons for its decision that such a contract is
invalid, as follows: "In the first place, a decision upholding such a con-
tract would confer upon one person occupying a position of trust toward
another unusual power over the latter in the control and management of his
own property, for we must not forget that the attorney has only a lien upon
the client's cause of action, which still remains the property of the latter.
It is not too much to assume that such power would at times be the source
of abuse as between the two parties. But more important than any such per-
sonal and private consderations is the one of public concern that such con-
tracts would prove added obstacles to that quieting of disputes, and to that
adjustment and settlement o~f litigation, which always has been and always
should be favored by the acts of legislatures, the decisions of courts, and
the expressions of public opinion; for, in my judgment, there is no need of
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long argument to demonstrate that such contracts would prove such
obstacles."
In spite, however, of the many good reasons for holding such stipula-
tions illegal as contrary to public policy, some courts have regarded them as
valid, or at least as not fatal to the whole contract (See Hoffman v. Vallejo,
45 Cal. 564; Taylor v. St. Louis Transit Co., 198 MO. 715, 731; Stmits v.
Hogan, 35 Wash. 29o; Granat v. Kruse, I4 Il. App. 488).
In the recent New York decision cited above (In re Snyder) judge
BARTirT, dissenting, says: "If it be the fact that this court has never
passed upon the validity of such a clause in a contract, I am of opinion
that it is valid. I see no reason why counsel entering upon a long and
difficult litigation for an impecunious client should not protect himself
against a premature and ill-advised settlement of the litigation by the
client. These contracts are under the strict supervision and scrutiny of
the courf, and I am unable to see anything in contravention of public policy
when this clause appears to have been entered into in good faith by both
parties. In the absence of such a clause, it has been frequently held in
this state and elsewhere that the client may negotiate an honest and reason-
able settlement at any time. There is no reason, in my judgment, why this
right cannot be waived."
While "impecunious clients," as well as clients not impecunious but simply
speculative, may sometimes treat unjustly counsel who have aided them, we
believe that the best interests of both the public and the profession will be
served by uphblding the doctrine of the principal case.
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